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REALITY CHECK: THE DRA'S IMPACT ON SENIORS
WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CAREGIVERS
Kim Dayton*
In February 2006, President Bush signed the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA),1 a sweeping federal spending bill
that did little to address budget deficits and nothing to reduce
the nation's debt. Among other things, the DRA made many
significant changes in federal law pertaining to the Medicaid
eligibility of persons sixty-five and older for Medicaid long-term
care benefits.2 The overriding goal of these amendments was to
make it even more difficult for seniors with disabilities to receive
public assistance in the event that they need long-term care. In
the coming decades, proponents of the legislation claimed, the
demands of these Americans with disabilities will place
enormous stress on federal and state budgets; restricting
* Kim Dayton is a law professor at the William Mitchell College of Law
where she teaches elder and health law. She received her B.A. from the
University of Kansas and a J.D. from the University of Michigan. Prof.
Dayton clerked with Judge James M. Sprouse on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and practiced with Shea & Gardner in
Washington D.C. She previously taught at the University of Kansas
School of Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.A.) (Westlaw current through Sept. 26, 2007).
2. For general overviews of the DRA's Medicaid related provisions, see CTR.
FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT, OVERVIEW, available
at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DeficitReductionAct/01_Overview.asp#TopOfPage;
Cong. Research Serv., CRS summary: S. 1932 [109th]: Deficit Reduction Act of 2005,
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl09-1932&tab=summary;
JEFFREY S. CROWLEY, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID LONG-TERM
SERVICE REFORMS IN THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT (2006) [hereinafter KAISER
MEDICAID LONG-TERM REFORMS], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload
/7486.pdf; NAT'L. CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005,
SUMMARY OF MEDICAID/MEDICARE/HEALTH PROVISIONS, http://www.ncsl.org/statef
ed/health/ReconDocs0206.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
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eligibility for Medicaid is the only way to prevent a fiscal crisis
and ensure that resources are available to the "truly needy."3
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the Medicaid-
related provisions of the DRA can be expected to reduce direct
federal spending on Medicaid benefits for seniors by some $6.3
billion over the ten-year period from 2006-2015.4
In the grand scheme of the federal budget for health care,
$6.3 billion saved is but a pittance. The Medicare prescription
drug benefit alone will cost taxpayers more than $675 billion
during the ten-year period over which these "savings" will be
spread.5 Moreover, as Ellen O'Brien demonstrates in her article,
included in this symposium issue, there is considerable doubt as
to whether the DRA will generate the cost savings that its
advocates have claimed. 6
Even if federal expenditures for long-term care will be
reduced because of Title VI, however, the DRA transfers
virtually all of these "savings" directly to our nation's most
vulnerable and politically powerless seniors: those with serious
disabilities, and their families.7 They also exacerbate Medicaid's
existing tendency to impose the great bulk of the economic,
social, and emotional burdens associated with late life, long-
3. "As Medicaid costs grow, there is a growing interest by many policy
makers, including some members of Congress, in restricting Medicaid eligibility to
the 'truly needy'. Tightening the eligibility standards for persons who transfer
assets is a key issue for many because they believe that existing standards permit
upper income individuals who have the resources to pay for their own long-term
services to qualify for Medicaid. Some contend that individuals may not plan
properly for their future needs because they know that Medicaid is available as a
safety net." KAISER MEDICAID LONG-TERM REFORMS, supra note 2, at 5. See GRACE-
MARIE TURNER, THE FUTURE OF LONG-TERM CARE AND MEDICAID 6 (July 10, 2006),
available at http://bartlett.house.gov/uploadedfiles/Tumer%20SBA%2OTestimony.p
df.
4. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE, S. 1932, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF
2005 37 (Jan. 27, 2006) [hereinafter CBO, 1932, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005].
5. HENRY J. KAISER FAMrLY FOUND., CBO LOWERS 10-YEAR COST ESTIMATE OF
MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT (2007), available at http://kaisemetwork.org
/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?DRID42519.
6. See generally Ellen O'Brien, What is Wrong with the Long-Term Care Reforms in
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005?, 9 ELDER'S ADVISOR 103 (2007).
7. See DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.) (Westlaw current through
Sept. 26, 2007).
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term disability on women. Implicitly, the DRA legitimizes and
perpetuates the view that disabled Americans (particularly, but
not exclusively, the elderly) and their families are not entitled to
rights and privileges afforded so-called "able-bodied" persons.
As such, the DRA is not a rational, neutral method of preserving
scarce public resources to ensure the welfare of all, but is instead
unjust and a reflection of society's general willingness to
devalue and marginalize particular disempowered groups.
There is no immediate Medicaid "crisis" stemming from
long-term care expenditures on the elderly; as such, the DRA
should be repealed while policymakers and politicians work
towards a long-term care financing scheme that fairly distributes
the costs of providing long-term care across the broader
population.
THE DRA IN CONTEXT
This section describes the phenomenon of the aging U.S.
population and the current means of financing health care for
the nation's older citizens.
APOCALYPTIC DEMOGRAPHY AND THE CHALLENGES OF AN AGING
SOCIETY
Global aging, like a massive iceberg, looms ahead in the
future of the largest and most affluent economies of the
world. Visible above the waterline are the
unprecedented growth in the number of elderly and the
unprecedented decline in the number of youth over the
next several decades. Lurking beneath the waves, and
not yet widely understood, are the wrenching economic
and social costs that will accompany this demographic
transformation-costs that threaten to bankrupt even the
greatest of powers, the United States included, unless
they take action in time.8
8. PETER G. PETERSON, GRAY DAWN: HOW THE COMING AGE WAVE WILL
TRANSFORM AMERICAN - AND THE WORLD 3-4 (1999).
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[A] real tidal wave is approaching. Everyone has heard
of it, so I suppose many think, since it is old news, it
must have been addressed. It is the tidal wave of an
aging population. It turns out that a tidal wave, or
tsunami, may be an apt analogy. How did the recent
tsunami manifest? Not in a single dramatic wave, but
rather a relentless series of surges that overwhelmed
what lay in their path.9
The cost of health care and retirement benefits of an
aging population threatens to bankrupt the nation
unless dramatic changes are made. The average
American retires five years earlier than in 1950 and
lives twelve years longer. This phenomenon - work
less, collect more - has ripped a hole in the senior
citizen safety net. The longer we live, the bigger the
hole. 1o
One can hardly turn on the television or open a newspaper
without being confronted with grim warnings about the impact
of the aging of the boomer generation on the national economy.
Over the past two decades, as discussions of global population
aging initiated by the United Nations, government agencies, and
academics" have filtered down into the popular press, the
rapidly increasing aging population in the United States is
almost inevitably characterized in the media and by politicians
as a social disaster that threatens to bankrupt the nation and
create an intergenerational civil war. This "apocalyptic
demography" has created a cult of fear of the inevitable and
9. Posting of Glen Hiemstra to Futuristblog (Jan. 14, 2005),
http://futuristblog.blogspot.com/2005/01/healthcare-and-elderly.html (last visited
Sept. 30, 2007).
10. Dennis Cauchon, Who Will Take Care of an Older Population?, USA TODAY,
Oct. 25, 2007, at B1.
11. See, e.g., U. N. DEP'T. OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV.,
POPULATION CHALLENGES AND DEVELOPMENT GOALS (2005), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/popchallenges/PopulationChalle
nges.pdf; U. N. DEP'T. OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIVISION, WORLD
POPULATION AGING: 1950-2050 (2002), available at http://www.un.org/esa/popula
tion/publications/worldageingl9502050/; U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE AND U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATL. INST. ON AGING, NATL. INST. OF HEALTH, WHY
POPULATION AGING MATTERS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Mar. 13, 2007),
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/81537.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
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very predictable graying of society that is the result of the
unprecedented and unrepeated increase in birthrates, both in the
United States and abroad, that followed World War II.
The argument that the nation's aging population presents
an economic threat that calls for cutting public benefits
(primarily Medicaid) is premised on the idea that as citizens age,
the number of individuals with disabilities and disease will
create a greater demand for health care, particularly long-term
care, than taxpayers can support. DRA's proponents contend
that by restricting access to government welfare programs now,
the nation can stave off this fiscal disaster and preserve benefits
for those who "really need them." The argument progresses
something like this:
* The number and percentage of elderly is increasing
rapidly. Between 2000 and 2050, the percentage of
Americans who are sixty-five-plus will increase
from 12.4% in 2005 to almost 20.7% in 2050.12 The
number of individuals eighty-five and older will
more than triple; these "oldest old" Americans will
comprise some 5% of the population by 2050, up
from 1.5% in 2000.13
* Elderly dependency ratios14  will increase
dramatically from today's 18/100 to 31/100 in less
than twenty-five years. This means that fewer
"working persons" will be supporting each elderly
person than ever before.15
12. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES INTERIM PROJECTIONS BY AGE, SEX,
RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, TABLE 2A, (2004) available at http://www.census.gov
/ipc/www/usinterimproj/natprojtab02a.pdf.
13. Id.
14. "Age-dependency ratios are a measure of the age structure of the
population. They relate the number of individuals that are likely to be 'dependent'
on the support of others for their daily living - youths and the elderly - to the
number of those individuals who are capable of providing such support." ORG.
FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., SOCIETY AT A GLANCE: OECD SOCIAL
INDICATORS, 42 (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/24/38148786.pdf.
15. These dependency ratios were generated from the U. N. DEP'T. OF ECON.
AND Soc. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIv., UNITED NATIONS WORLD POPULATION
DATABASE, http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=7 (last visited Nov. 27, 2007)
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* Age equals disability. The elderly experience higher
levels of disability than younger populations; thus, a
disproportionate share of the disabled population is
elderly.16
* In future decades, national health care expenditures
will comprise an increasing share of the gross
domestic product. "
* Long-term care expenditures will comprise an
increasing share of total health care expenditures
and of the federal Medicaid budget. 8
* The elderly demand disproportionately more health
care, including long-term care, than other age
groups. 19
* Disabled persons demand more health care,
including long-term care, than non-disabled
persons.
Therefore, some contend, the nation cannot afford the cost
of long-term care for the elderly and disabled, and their
[hereinafter UNITED NATIONS WORLD POPULATION DATABASE]. The United Nations
defines the old-age dependency ratio as "the number of working age persons (age
15 - 64 years) per older person (65 years or older)" for purposes of calculating and
projecting dependency ratios in member nations.
16. Estimating levels of disability in any population is difficult because
definitions of disability differ from person to person and from survey to survey.
Nevertheless, it is virtually a truism that older persons are more likely than
younger ones to have physical and cognitive impairments that affect their ability to
perform various activities of daily living or to experience their environments. For
example, the risk of developing Alzheimer's disease increases from 10% at age 65 to
as high as 50% at age 85. ALZHEIMER'S Ass'N, ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE, CAUSES & RISK
FACTORS, http://www.alz.org/alzheimers-disease.causes riskfactors.asp (last
visited Nov. 27, 2007).
17. See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SNAPSHOTS: COMPARING PROJECTED
GROWTH IN HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES AND THE ECONOMY (2006), available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/chm050206oth2.cfm.
18. The Congressional Budget Office estimated in 1999 that inflation-adjusted
expenditures for long-term care for the elderly would grow annually by 2.6 percent
between 2000 and 2040. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROJECTIONS OF EXPENDITURES FOR
LONG-TERM CARE SERVICE FOR THE ELDERLY, 1-2 (1999), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=1123&type=0&sequence=0.
19. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, MEDICAID AND LONG-TERM CARE SERVICE, 1 (2006), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Medicaid-and-Long-Term-Care-ServicesPDF.
pdf.
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entitlement to such care at public expense should be minimized.
Instead, the elderly and disabled have a "personal
responsibility" for any long-term care needs they may have in
the future and should plan accordingly.
Apocalyptic demography, coupled with a fear of and
disdain for elders with disabilities, lie at the heart of the
"reforms" in the Medicaid eligibility rules reflected in the DRA.
The notion that the United States population is aging is true.
The DRA's proponents claim has painted a picture of a future
United States that is devastated by the demands of its disabled
elderly population. The disabled elderly must be held
accountable to pay for their own health care needs now to
ensure that benefits are available for others later. But the line of
reasoning set out above as a justification for the mean-spirited
assault on elders with disabilities implicit in the DRA does not
withstand close scrutiny.
PUTTING THE MEDICAID "CRISIS" IN PERSPECTIVE
Because the doomsday scenario depicted by apocalyptic
demography is grounded in readily documented facts,
policymakers and others who would limit access to Medicaid by
the nation's most vulnerable elders, those with severe
disabilities, have eagerly exploited it. The big picture of global
and national aging, though it requires our leaders' attention, is
considerably less grim. On one hand, it is certainly true that the
aging population will increase rather dramatically over the next
fifty years as a percentage of the whole.20 On the other, a rapid
rise in the number and percent of elderly is not without
precedent in this country. In fact, the total number of persons
age sixty-five and older almost quadrupled in the United States
between 1900 and 1950.21 This demographic shift had eventual
20. Id.
21. ADMIN. ON AGING, OLDER POPULATION BY AGE: 1900-2050 (2005), available at
http://www.aoa.gov/prof/Statistics/online-statdata/AgePop205O.asp (showing
elderly population increased from 3.08 million persons in 1900 to 12.27 million in
1950).
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consequences-one of them was the Medicare program-but
this demographic shift did not bankrupt the nation.
The growth of the sixty-five and older population that will
occur over the next forty-odd years is not akin to an
unpredictable natural disaster, nor is it a bizarre fluke. It is
simply "the rat in the python," a bulge in the population
pyramid representing the boomer generation as it moves from
middle into old age. Just as a historically disproportional
allocation of resources toward education was required in the
1950's and 1960's,22 a larger allocation of resources towards
health and long-term care will be required as our nation grows
old. This phenomenon will demand a rethinking of fiscal
priorities and a restructuring of the funding mechanisms that
support the kinds of services most needed by the elderly, but it
does not imply fiscal disaster. As will be discussed below, the
DRA does not involve restructuring anything; rather, it ignores
the realities of aging and disability in our society and tinkers
with a fundamentally flawed health and long-term care
financing mechanisms to achieve short-term, insignificant
savings. The proper question is not, "how can we limit access to
Medicaid-financed long-term care?". Instead, the question
should be, "what is the most fiscally and morally responsible
way to pay for the future long-term care needs of the baby
boomer generation?".
Although the elderly dependency ratio is increasing, this
ratio overstates the burden on public resources created by an
elderly population. Among other things, the elderly
dependency ratio assumes that persons sixty-five and older do
not contribute to national economies. 23 In recent years, however,
workers sixty-five and older have been participating in the paid
workforce in increasing numbers. 24 The old-age dependency
22. See U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., NAT'L. CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION
OF EDUCATION 2002, 111, available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/2002025.pdf
(showing change in national public and personal expenditures for education, 1950-
1999).
23. See UNITED NATIONS WORLD POPULATION DATABASE, supra note 15.
24. Abraham Mosisa & Steven Hipple, Trends in Labor Force Participation in the
20 [Vol. 9
DRA'S IMPACT ON SENIORS
ratio does not account for the value of unpaid services provided
by older persons, such as informal care giving and volunteerism,
which add hundreds of billions of dollars to the national
economy. 25 More importantly, apocalyptic demography tends
to ignore the fact that the nation's total dependency ratio, which
considers the number of "working age" persons who are
supporting children and the elderly combined, will never be as
high as it was in 1960, when baby boom births were winding
down. The total dependency ratio will not begin rising above its
current level of 49/100 until 2010.26 This ratio will be 62/100 in
2050, when the nation's elderly population peaks at about
eighty-four million, which is well short of the 1960 peak of
67/100.27
Elderly dependency ratio Total dependency ratio
1950 13/100 54/100
1960 15/100 67/100
2005 18/100 49/100
2030 31/100 60/100
2050 34/100 62/10028
Even assuming that the elderly consume more tax-supported
resources per capita than children, the rising old-age
United States, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 53 (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.bls.
gov/opub/mlr/2006/10/art3full.pdf.
25. See, e.g., Richard W. Johnson & Simone G. Schaner, Value of Caregiving,
Volunteering by Seniors Valued at $162 Billion Per Year, in THE RETIREMENT PROJECT:
PERSPECTIVES ON PRODUCTIVE AGING, No. 4, 1 (Sept. 2005), available at http:/www.
urban.org/UploadedPDF/311227_older americans.pdf.
26. U.N. DEP'T. OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, POPULATION Div., WORLD
POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2006 REVISION AND WORLD URBANIZATION
PROSPECTS, available at http://esa.un.org/unpp.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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dependency ratio cannot be discussed in isolation from its
broader context.
Moreover, although a correlation between age and
disability exists, this correlation does not inevitably imply that
our aging society will demand proportionately more resources
for health and long-term care due to age-related disabilities. In
recent years, conflicting data have emerged with respect to
whether disability rates among the aged are in decline. Overall,
disability rates by age have decreased over the last two
decades. 29 While some researchers predict that they will soon
stabilize or even begin increasing due to high obesity and
diabetes rates among the boomer population, the jury is out on
this issue.
Even as the number of elderly entering nursing homes
declines, the total number of elderly individuals with limitations
affecting their ability to perform important daily activities is
increasing, primarily because of longer life spans. Assistive
technology and community-based alternatives to institutional
care contributed to declining per capita cost of addressing the
long-term care requirements of elderly persons with disabilities.
Although it is likely that the total number of elderly persons
with significant disability will increase as the population ages
and life expectancy increases, it is not clear which particular
elderly individuals will need long-term care, what sort of
assistance they will need, or how much that assistance will cost.
Irrespective of how the statistics sort themselves out, it is more
equitable to spread the future costs of age-related disability
across the entire population rather than forcing particular
individuals who experience disability due to disease or acute
illness, to pay them in their entirety.
LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY IN THE
UNITED STATES
The DRA was the product of an end-of-days
29. Id.
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characterization of population aging combined with assertions
that the tax base cannot sustain the current long-term care
financing scheme unless undeserving seniors who benefit from
the Medicaid program are rooted out immediately. To
appreciate the defective picture the DRA's most vocal advocates
paint, one must have some understanding of how long-term care
for elders with disabilities has historically been financed and
whether the DRA sought to alter that financing structure.
The components of health care generally include preventive
care, acute care, and long-term care, although some may use
different terminology to describe these components. Preventive
care is "the systemic and systematically delivered population-
directed services in areas such as vaccination, screening, and
prenatal care."30 Acute (or curative) care is that which addresses
a specific, existing illness or injury. Acute care is provided in
hospitals, emergency rooms, and physicians' offices. Long-term
care, although not as easily definable as preventive and acute
care, is a mix of medical, social, and personal services required
because of a debilitating illness or disability that interferes with
a person's ability to perform certain daily activities. Chronic
care and custodial care are alternative terms for these
components. When long-term care is provided in an
institutional setting, it also includes a room and board
component. It is not always easy to distinguish among these
components when attempting to categorize a particular service
provided to an individual receiving long-term care.
In most of the industrialized world, access to health care is
treated as a right, not a privilege. The United States is alone
among the world's major industrialized nations, as represented
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development 1 (OECD), in failing to guarantee access to primary
30. Martin Marshall et al., OECD Health Care Quality Indicator Project. The
Expert Panel on Primary Care Prevention and Health Promotion, INT'L J. FOR QUALITY IN
HEALTH CARE 21, 22 (Sept. 2006), available at http://intqhc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/
content/full/18/suppl_/21?ijkey=BT8Q5QCoHyR1w&keytype-ref&siteid-intqhc.
31. OECD nations include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Hungary,
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and acute health care for all its citizens. 2  Although the
particulars of national health insurance programs differ with
respect to financing, administration, and range of services, all
assure a basic level of preventive and acute care to everyone.
Among the thirty nations composing the OECD, the United
States contributes the smallest percentage of public funding
towards total health care expenditures: less than forty-five
percent compared with an OECD average of seventy-two and a
half percent.33 Although the United States spends far more on
health care, both per capita and as a percentage of gross
domestic product than any other nation,3 health-related
outcomes in our nation, as measured by life expectancy, infant
mortality, and other factors, fall well short of those of its peers.35
MEDICARE: NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE ELDERLY
Although the United States does not have national health
insurance or anything comparable for the general population, 36
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION
AND DEV., OECD HEALTH DATA 2007, COUNTRY DIAGRAMS: CHARTS ON HEALTH
CARE SYSTEMS (July 2007), http://www.ecosante.org/OCDEENG/12.html (last visited
Nov. 27, 2007).
32. For general information about health care delivery and financing in the
world's major developed nations, see ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV.,
supra note 31.
33. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD IN FIGURES 2006-2007,
DEMOGRAPHY AND HEALTH, HEALTH SPENDING AND RESOURCES (2007),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/427077022807 (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
34. Id.; ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD HEALTH DATA 2007:
How DOES THE UNITED STATES COMPARE? (2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
46/2/38980580.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
35. See generally Karen Davis et al., Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: An International
Update on the Comparative Performance of American Health Care, THE COMMONWEALTH
FUND (May 15, 2007), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/
publicationsshow.htm?docid=482678#areaCitation ("Compared with five other
nations-Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom-the
U.S. health care system ranks last or next-to-last on five dimensions of a high
performance health system: quality, access, efficiency, equity, and healthy lives.")
36. Fewer than 60% of Americans who have health insurance obtain it through
their own or their spouse's employer, or as the dependent of an insured. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE HIGHLIGHTS 2006, available at http
://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/hlthinO6/fig7.pdf. The number of
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the vast majority of the nation's elderly citizens have guaranteed
access to acute and catastrophic health care through the federal
Medicare program.17  The idea of a publicly financed health
insurance program limited to seniors was proposed as early as
1937,38 and serious efforts began during the Truman
administration 39 to provide a federal health care benefit to Social
Security recipients. 40 As the cost of hospital care increased at
exponential rates, the need for some form of universal health
insurance for this population was apparent: only one in four
uninsured Americans of all ages increased from 44.8 million in 2005 to 47.0 million
in 2006, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 2006 AND 2007
ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENTS: COVERAGE BY TYPE OF HEALTH
INSURANCE: 2005 AND 2006, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/
hlthinO6/figO6.pdf. Eighteen percent of working-age women and twenty-two
percent of working-age men lack any kind of health insurance. See HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., STATE HEALTH FACTS, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE OF WOMEN
19-64, STATES (2004-2005), UNITED STATES (2005), http://www.statehealthfacts.org
/comparebar.jsp?ind=132&cat-3; HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE OF MEN 19-64, STATES (2004-2005), UNITED STATES (2005),
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparebar.jsp?ind=133&cat3.
37. See generally CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE
OVERVIEW, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareGenlnfo/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2007)
(describing the coverage of Medicare).
38. "The first person to suggest that Government health insurance be limited
(at least at first) to Social Security beneficiaries was Dr. Thomas Parran of the Public
Health Service, in 1937." PETER A. CORNING, THE EVOLUTION OF MEDICARE ...
FROM IDEA TO LAW CH. 4 THE FOURTH ROUND-1957 TO 1965 (1969), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/corningchap4.html.
39. Throughout his presidency, President Truman pushed for national health
insurance not just for the elderly, but for all Americans. In his memoirs, he wrote,
"I have had some bitter disappointments as President, but the one that has troubled
me most, in a personal way, has been the failure to defeat the organized opposition
to a National compulsory health insurance program. But this opposition has only
delayed and cannot stop the adoption of an indispensable Federal health insurance
plan." HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS BY HARRY S. TRUMAN, VOL. 2: YEARS OF TRIAL
AND HOPE 23 (Doubleday & Co. 1956). Nine years after penning those words,
Truman became the very first American to enroll in the Medicare program. HENRY
J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: A TIMELINE OF KEY DEVELOPMENTS, available
at http://www.kff.org/medicare/timeline/pf.entire.htm [hereinafter MEDICARE: A
TIMELINE OF KEY DEVELOPMENTS].
40. See CORNING, supra note 38. "The 1950 census showed that the aged
population had grown from 3 million in 1900 to 12 million in 1950, or from 4 to 8
percent of the total population. Two-thirds of these people had incomes of less than
$1,000 annually, and only 1 in 8 had health insurance. Old people were long
considered 'bad risks" by commercial insurers, and unions had not made much
headway in obtaining coverage for retired workers through employer-sponsored
plans." Id.
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seniors had "adequate" catastrophic health care insurance.4'
Although the American Medical Association and private-sector
insurance conglomerates spared no expense in opposing
"socialist medicine" for seniors, 42 hospitals, which were bearing
most of the costs of paying for health care for uninsured seniors,
supported the legislation and were instrumental in securing
final passage of the federal Medicare bill.43
Medicare, thus, is the nation's "universal" health care
program for the elderly." Financed primarily by payroll
deductions, general federal revenues, and insurance premiums
paid by beneficiaries, 45 Medicare assures universal coverage for
some kinds of health care for virtually all the nation's seniors.
Individuals who have accumulated enough Social Security work
credits to qualify for Social Security benefits at age sixty-two are
automatically entitled to Medicare Part A hospital benefits at age
sixty-five and can receive Part B medical and Part D prescription
drug benefits upon enrollment and payment of appropriate
41. Id. at 17. "By 1964 the proportion of the aged who were privately insured
for hospital care seemed to be leveling off at about 50 percent. A Senate study that
year estimated that only one-half of the policies issued to retirees provided
comprehensive coverage (75 percent or more of the average hospital bill). In other
words, only about 1 in 4 of the aged had adequate hospital insurance protection."
Id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Medicare also covers some non-elderly individuals who have permanent
disabilities or certain terminal diseases. 42 U.S.C. 1395c. "The insurance program
for which entitlement is established by sections 226 and 226A provides basic
protection against the costs of hospital, related post-hospital, home health services,
and hospice care in accordance with this part for (1) individuals who are age 65 or
over and are eligible for retirement benefits under title II of this Act (or would be
eligible for such benefits if certain government employment were covered
employment under such title) or under the railroad retirement system, (2)
individuals under age 65 who have been entitled for not less than 24 months to
benefits under title II of this Act (or would have been so entitled to such benefits if
certain government employment were covered employment under such title) or
under the railroad retirement system on the basis of a disability, and (3) certain
individuals who do not meet the conditions specified in either clause (1) or (2) but
who are medically determined to have end stage renal disease." Id.
45. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE FACT SHEET: MEDICARE
SPENDING AND FINANCING 2 (June 2007), available at http://www.kff.org/medi
care/upload/7305-02.pdf.
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premiums. 46 Persons sixty-five years of age and older who do
not qualify for the program based on their work history may
buy into Medicare upon payment of a relatively modest
premium. Individuals cannot be excluded due to health
conditions, as they would be under the pre-existing private
insurance model.47 Medicare also covers limited preventive care
such as some cancer, cardiovascular and diabetes screening tests,
and a one-time "Welcome to Medicare" physical examination. 48
Beneficiaries can purchase a standardized supplemental
"Medigap" policy that covers preventive care. 49  In some
circumstances, Medicare provides coverage of a relatively short
(up to 100 days) stay in skilled nursing or rehabilitation facilities,
provided the stay is preceded by a hospitalization of at least
three days for an acute illness or injury.50  The Part D
prescription drug benefit was implemented pursuant to the
provisions of the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and
Modernization Act of 2003 to remedy Medicare's long-time
failure to cover prescription drugs." In 2005, Medicare covered
some 35.6 million elderly beneficiaries, totaling 97% of the
nation's sixty-five and older population. 52
46. For detailed information on Medicare's eligibility requirements and scope
of coverage, see CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE AND You 8,
10, 28 (2007), available at http://www.medicare.gov/publications/pubs/pdf/10050.pdf
[hereinafter MEDICARE AND YOU].
47. Vicki Gottlich, Medical Necessity Determinations in the Medicare Program: Are
the Interests of Beneficiaries with Chronic Conditions Being Met?, PARTNERSHIP FOR
SOLUTIONS, Jan. 2003, at 3 [hereinafter Medical Necessity Determinations in Medicare].
48. See generally MEDICARE AND YOU, supra note 46 (discussing scope of
Medicare coverage with respect to preventive care services).
49. CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. , CHOOSING A MEDIGAP POLICY:
A GUIDE TO HEALTH INS. FOR PEOPLE WITH MEDICARE 3 (Mar. 2007), available at
http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/02110.pdf [hereinafter CHOOSING
A MEDIGAP POLICY].
50. CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE COVERAGE OF SKILLED
NURSING FACILITY CARE 8 (April 2002), available at http://www.medicare.gov/pub
lications/pubs/pdf/snf.pdf
51. See DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.) (Westlaw current through
Sept. 26, 2007).
52. NAT'L. COMM'N. TO PRESERVE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE, FAST FACTS
ABOUT MEDICARE, http://www.ncpssm.org/medicare/fastfactm/ (last visited Sept.
30, 2007).
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One of Medicare's most notable features is that it pays for
virtually all hospital and acute care services that are determined,
by a qualified medical professional, to be "medically necessary"
to the beneficiary.53  Medical necessity standards used to
determine coverage come from the Medicare statute as
interpreted by CMS and its delegates in national and local
coverage determinations and other policy documents.54
Medical necessity is a notoriously complex concept that
differs in its application depending on the nature of the services
to be provided. CMS has defined it to mean "services or
supplies that are needed for the diagnosis or treatment of [a]
medical condition and meet accepted standards of medical
practice."55 Coverage determinations are "big picture" decisions
based on whether a particular therapy or treatment is a
generally reasonable response to specific clinical conditions.
Beneficiaries who manifest these clinical symptoms are entitled
to, and often receive, all approved treatments without regard to
cost-benefit analysis in their particular situations. 56  This
approach has resulted in greatly increased Medicare outlays for
expensive medical technology and now poses as great a threat to
Medicare's long-term solvency as does the nation's aging
population." Medicare beneficiaries receive their benefits free
of any obligation to repay the government the amount it spends
on their care, even if their lifestyle or health status is such that
53. The medical necessity standard is based on the statutory prohibition of
payment for services that are "not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or
treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a mal-formed body
member." DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395(y)(a)(1)(A)) (Westlaw current through
Sept. 26, 2007).
54. See Medical Necessity Determinations in Medicare, supra note 47, at 3.
55. MEDICARE AND YOU, supra note 46, at 98.
56. See Medical Necessity Determinations in Medicare, supra note 47, at 4.
57. See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., How CHANGES IN MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY AFFECT HEALTH CARE COSTS (Mar. 2007), available at http://
www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/chcm03O807oth.cfm; Karen Davis et al., Slowing
the Growth of U.S. Health Care Expenditures: What Are the Options?, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, Jan. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.commonwealth
fund.org/usr doc/Davis-slowinggrowthUShltcareexpenditureswhatareoptions_989.
pdf?section=4039.
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they will use more Medicare resources than the "average"
Medicare recipient is expected to consume. 8
LONG-TERM CARE - THE ORPHAN OF NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE PROGRAMS
Notwithstanding their general commitment to providing
universal health care access, the United States' peer nations have
not historically included long-term care in the range of their
provided services. The reasons for this omission include the
amorphous nature of long-term care, which encompasses
components that are not strictly "medical," as well as the fact
that the vast majority of long-term care in these nations (as in the
United States) has always been provided to the elderly in their
homes, by unpaid family caregivers. It is only in recent years, as
the number of and life expectancies of elderly persons have
increased while family sizes have shrunk and more women are
working outside the home, that the need to re-examine the
means of caring for the frail elderly, and paying for this care, has
become apparent globally. Interestingly, the world's "oldest"
major industrialized nations, including Japan and Germany,
have both recently implemented nationally-financed social
insurance programs that provide a wide variety of long-term
care services to elderly individuals with self-care limitations due
to physical or cognitive impairments. 59 Other nations that have
had a strong commitment to social welfare and health care
access are likely to follow these examples in the relatively near
future.60
58. see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HIGH-COST MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 10 (May
2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index6332&type=0.
59. See MARTIN KARLSSON ET AL., AN INT'L COMPARISON OF LONG-TERM CARE
ARRANGEMENTS 27 (Apr. 26, 2004), available at http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/medial
stories/resources/Full-report-_.LTC.pdf.
60. For example, the Canadian Medical Association recently called for inclusion
of long-term care benefits in that nation's national health insurance program.
Andre Picard, Doctors' Orders: Expand Medical Coverage to Long-Term Care, TORONTO
GLOBE AND MAIL, Aug. 21, 2007, at A5.
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FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE FOR ELDERLY AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES
The United States' Medicare program does not offer a
genuine "long-term care benefit" for the disabled elderly who
will need chronic or custodial care for lengthy periods. 61 This is
true even though their need for such care is almost inevitably
the result of identifiable medical conditions such as diabetes,
stroke, or Alzheimer's disease related dementia. 62  A
considerable proportion of Medicare beneficiaries will need
what might be called "short term long-term care" in a skilled
nursing facility or rehabilitation center, but such stays rarely last
more than twenty days. Of the nation's total outlay for long-
term care in 2004, Medicare accounted for only sixteen percent
of total long-term care expenditures.0  The major gap in
Medicare's coverage of the health care needs of seniors remains
its lack of a long-term care benefit. 64  Medicare covers very
expensive treatments for acute health conditions experienced by
non-disabled persons, while failing to address the health care
needs of a person with long-term disabilities such as those
resulting from Alzheimer's disease or post-polio syndrome, an
anomoly that Professor Kaplan notes reeks of "the stench of
arbitrariness." 65
61. Medicare has a limited home health benefit that provides payment for some
types of care given to persons who return to their homes after a hospital stay of
three days or more, but this benefit is not the kind of "long-term care" at issue in
the long-term care financing debate.
62. In 2004, 24.7 % of elderly nursing home permanent residents had dementia,
23.7% had diabetes, 36.6% had heart disease, and 24.8% had had at least one stroke.
Most such residents had multiple diagnoses. See JUDITH KASPER & MOLLY
O'MALLEY, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., CHANGES IN CHARACTERISTICS,
NEEDS, AND PAYMENT FOR CARE OF ELDERLY NURSING HOME RESIDENTS: 1999 TO
2004 10 (June 2007), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7663.pdf
[hereinafter CHANGES IN CHARACTERISTICS].
63. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 3
(Apr. 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/54xx/doc5400/04-26-LongTerm
Care.pdf [hereinafter FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY].
64. Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning's Greatest Gap: Funding Long-term
Care, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 407, 409 (2007) [hereinafter Retirement Planning's
Greatest Gap].
65. Richard L. Kaplan, Cracking the Conundrum: Toward a Rational Financing of
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One might ask why a health care program designed
specifically for the elderly would not cover such a critical
component of health care as long-term care. There are a number
of reasons that Medicare lacks a long-term care benefit, most
notably because its original parameters were defined by
reference to the coverage offered by the typical private health
insurance plan then available, 66 which did not (and still do not)
include long-term care benefits. Additionally, in 1965, most
skilled nursing care of the sort now offered in nursing homes,
and even in assisted living facilities, was provided in long-term
care wards in hospitals so that the care was actually included
within the Part A benefit. 67 In 1988, a bipartisan study group
known as the Pepper Commission was established to consider
whether a long-term care benefit should be included in
Medicare. 68 The Pepper Commission recommended adding
long-term and home-health care benefits to Medicare, but the
recommendation was ignored.69  Furthermore, Medicare
beneficiaries whose disabilities are severe enough that they need
long-term care must find other payment sources to finance such
care. At present, some access long-term care through state
medical assistance programs implemented under the federal
Medicaid laws and regulations.
The federal-state Medicaid program, which has been
characterized as an "afterthought" to Medicare,70 dates back to
1965. Medicaid is a social welfare program financed from
Long-term Care, 47 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 84 (2004).
66. Thomas A. Scully, Adm'r of Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs.,
Strengthening and Improving the Medicare Program, Hearing Before the Senate
Finance Committee, 108"h Cong. (2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify
/t030606.html.
67. Kaplan, supra note 65, at 83.
68. MEDICARE: A TIMELINE OF KEY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 38; See THE
PEPPER COMM., A CALL FOR ACTION: FINAL REPORT 1990 (Sept. 1990).
69. Numerous bills providing for public financing of long-term care have been
introduced, and languished, since the Pepper Commission's report was published.
See, e.g., H.R. 1691, 103rd Cong. (1st Sess. 1993); H.R. 1200, 103rd Cong., (1st. Sess.
1993).
70. E.g., Nancy De Lew, Overview: 40th anniversary of Medicare and Medicaid,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 5, 7 (Winter 2005).
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general state and federal revenues that affords access to health
care for the nation's poorest citizens.71 Only individuals at or
very near the poverty level are income-eligible for Medicaid, and
an applicant/recipient generally may retain only $2000 to $3000
in non-exempt assets.72 Beneficiaries must liquidate excess
assets and use them to pay for care before Medicaid assistance is
available.73 States are required to follow some federal standards
in establishing Medicaid programs, but they have considerable
leeway to create their own eligibility requirements and to
interpret the language of Medicaid's implementing regulations
in creating medical assistance programs financed in part
through federal Medicaid appropriations. 74
In every state, the range of services available to those
eligible for Medicaid includes long-term care. Usually, this
means chronic and custodial care offered in a skilled nursing
facility or similar institution. For most of Medicaid's history, the
program has had a distinct institutional bias and has not offered
recipients the option of receiving long-term care in their own
homes. This bias has begun to shift as a response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. Zimring,7 1 in which the
Supreme Court affirmed the right of individuals with disabilities
71. See JEFFERY S. CROWLEY & RISA ELIAS, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
KAISER COMM. ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, Medicaid's Role for People with
Disabilities 2 (Aug. 2003) (comprehensive overview of Medicaid benefits), available
at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Medicaid-s-Role-for-People-with-Disabilitie
s.pdf.
72. See, e.g., CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY:
OVERVIEW, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEligibility/; A. KIMBERLEY
DAYTON, ET AL., ADVISING THE ELDERLY CLIENT, Chs. 29-30 (2006).
73. TIMOTHY WAIDMANN & KORBIN LIU, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
KAISER COMM. ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, ASSET TRANSFER AND NURSING
HOME USE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND POLICY SIGNIFICANCE 1 (2006), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7487.pdf [hereinafter ASSET TRANSFER AND
NURSING HOME USE].
74. This leeway derives both from the nature of the program itself, which
contemplates state-by-state variations in the services available under the Medicaid
moniker, and because there is very little accountability on the part of state
administrative agencies that promulgate state rules and regulations and enforce
them against a population that usually lacks the resources to challenge even clear
violations of federal law. See Julia Belian, State Implementation of the Optional
Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 9 ELDER'S ADVISOR 63, 68-71 (2007).
75. Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
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to receive public benefits and services in the community if
feasible. Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have
obtained a "home and community based service" waiver
(sometimes called a section 1915 waiver) from federal
authorities. 76 Home and community based services now account
for about 37% of Medicaid's total long-term care expenditures,
which is up from fourteen percent in 1991.7 The DRA contains
provisions that make it easier for states to implement systems
for delivering all forms of long-term care (including custodial
care) in non-institutional settings,78 but in most states, Medicaid-
financed long-term care for seniors with disabilities is still
provided primarily in skilled nursing or similar facilities.
ASSET TRANSFER PENALTIES
As discussed earlier, Medicaid eligibility is based on both
income and assets. Individuals seeking public benefits to pay
for long-term care must apply for such benefits with the state
agency responsible for administering the Medicaid program.
Applicants for state medical assistance may retain no more than
76. General information on the home and community based services waiver is
available at CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID STATE WAIVER
PROGRAM, GEN. INFO., HCBS WAIVERS -SECTION 1915(c), available at http://www.cm
s.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGI/05_HCBSWaivers-Sectionl9l5(c).asp; See
also, e.g., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER COMM. ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, MEDICAID 1915(C) HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICE PROGRAMS:
DATA UPDATE 2 (2006), available at http://kff.org/medicaid/upload/7575.pdf.
77. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID AND LONG-TERM CARE SERVICE
2 (2006), available at http://kff.org/medicaid/upload/Medicaid-and-Long-Term-Care-
Services-PDF.pdf.
78. "Section 6086 [of the DRA] contains the provisions from Title II of S. 1602,
the Improving Long-Term Care Choices Act, introduced by Senators Charles
Grassley (R-IA), Evan Bayh (D-IN), and Hillary Clinton (D-NY) with the support of
the disability community. These provisions of Section 6086 will: establish a new
option for states to provide home- and community-based services (HCBS) without
states needing to use a waiver process; allow states to provide any of the services
now covered under HCBS waivers; and require states to establish stricter eligibility
(level of care) criteria for institutional services than for community-based services.
In addition, states may continue to provide services through their existing waiver
programs." DISABILITY POLICY COLLABORATION, THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF
2005 P.L. 109-171 2, available at http://www.ucp.org/uploads/Deficit-Reduction
_Act of_2005_March_06.doc.
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$2000 to $3000 in non-exempt, available assets.79 The vast
majority of elderly Medicaid applicants -historically, widows
with disabilities who need long-term care in an institutional
setting-are low or moderate-income individuals whose only
significant asset is the equity in their homes.80 One recent study
indicated that the median net worth of Medicaid applicants,
excluding home equity, is less than $24,000.81
The federal tax laws allow and perhaps encourage the
nation's wealthiest taxpayers to make inter-generational
transfers prior to death in order to reduce estate tax liability.82
Similarly, federal Medicaid law has always permitted persons
with disabilities who might face a need for long-term care to
make gifts, transfer ownership of real property, and otherwise
reduce the value of their non-exempt assets to meet Medicaid's
asset restrictions.83  Nevertheless, such transfers have
consequences. Before 1993, transfers made within thirty months
of the date of an application for state medical assistance could
result in denial of benefits for a maximum of thirty months.M
With the enactment of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
79. Assests vary somewhat by state. The laws and regulations determining
what resources and assets are considered available and classifying particular kinds
of assets are of dizzying complexity; a discussion of these concepts is well beyond
the scope of this article. For a general overview of Medicaid's asset limits and
transfer rules, see A. KIMBERLEY DAYTON, ET AL., supra note 71, at §§ 29:84 to 29:112.
80. See CHANGES IN CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 61, at 2.
81. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID LONG-TERM CARE: FEW
TRANSFERRED ASSETS BEFORE APPLYING FOR NURSING HOME COVERAGE; IMPACT OF
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT ON ELIGIBILITY IS UNCERTAIN GAO-07-280 26 (Mar. 2007),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07280.pdf [hereinafter GAO LONG-
TERM CARE].
82. See generally, e.g., Melissa Street, A Holistic Approach to Estate Planning:
Paramount in Protecting Your Family, Your Wealth, and Your Legacy, 7 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 141 (2007) ("Estate planning encompasses a broad area of laws, from
wills and trusts, to property and tax, to insurance and employee benefits. Over the
years, it has become "a highly complex and specialized field in which tax and
financial experts fine-tune plans to minimize taxes and maximize economic gain."
Thus, what begins as the charitable intent of testators to pass gifts on to their loved
ones, becomes tax-centered."(footnotes omitted)).
83. See A. KIMBERLEY DAYTON, ET AL., supra note 72, at § 29:85.
84. DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(K)) (Westlaw current through Sept. 26, 2007).
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1993 (OBRA '93),85 such transfers, if made for less than fair
market value, had the potential to subject an applicant to a
period during which the applicant would be ineligible for public
benefits for a much longer period.86 Reduced to its essence, the
asset transfer provisions of OBRA '93 required states to deny
Medicaid benefits to otherwise eligible Medicaid applicants for a
period of months equal to the ratio of the value of a transferred
asset divided by a dollar amount determined by the state to
reflect the average cost of nursing home care in the state. 7 The
"start date" for calculating this penalty period began, under pre-
DRA law, on the first day of the month following the date of the
transfer.88
To discourage individuals with disabilities from making
asset transfers, including those routinely made as part of a
comprehensive estate plan (such as gifting to family members),
OBRA '93 established a thirty-six month "look-back period."
This obliged states to examine all transfers of assets by Medicaid
applicants that occurred in the thirty-six months prior to the
application date and calculate an appropriate penalty period for
85. OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993, P.L. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.A.) (Westlaw current through
Sept. 26, 2007).
86. See A. KIMBERLEY DAYTON ET AL., supra note 72, at §§ 29:84 to 29:86.
87. DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(C)(1)(b)(i)) (Westlaw current through Sept. 26,
2007). The value of this divisor varies widely among the states, but generally
significantly understates the actual cost of institutional level care. In Minnesota, for
example, the asset transfer penalty divisor was $4438 /month from July 2006 to July
2007. See Statewide Average Payment for Skilled Nursing Facility Care, http://
hcopub.dhs.state.mn.us/hcpmstd/22_35.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2007). In contrast,
an independent survey of the cost of nursing home care the metropolitan Twin
Cities area found the average cost of a semiprivate room in 2006 to be $191/day or
$5730/ month. METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, LIFEPLANS, INC., METLIFE
MARKET SURVEY OF NURSING HOME & HOME CARE COSTS (Sept. 2006), available at
http://www.metlife.com/WPSAssets/18756958281159455975V1F2006NHHCMarketS
urvey.pdf. Because the penalty divisor amount understates the actual cost of care
even for the "average" beneficiary, the penalty period goes beyond providing a sort
of restitution to the state, but actually operates to punish the disabled elder who
transferred assets within the five year look-back period. As will be discussed later
in this article, the punitive aspects of the asset transfer penalty are greatly
magnified by the DRA.
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(c)(1)(D)(ii) (Westlaw current through Sept. 26, 2007).
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each such transfer. 9  Transfers were not cumulative; each
individual transfer resulted in its own penalty consequences that
began in the month after the transfer occurred.90
"PICKING THE BONES OF THE DISABLED ELDERLY" 91 : ESTATE
RECOVERY UNDER MEDICAID 92
One of OBRA '93's most draconian provisions was section
13612,93 which required individual states to file so-called "estate
recovery" claims against the estate of any person who received
Medicaid benefits from the state prior to death. 94 For example, if
a Medicaid recipient has equity in a home, the state can place a
lien or assert a "notice of potential claim" against the property
and enforce the lien during probate.95 Implementation of OBRA
'93's statutory mandate of estate recovery has been uneven, 96 but
the value of payments recovered varies greatly among the
89. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i).
90. § 1396p(c)(1)(D).
91. ROGER SCHWARTZ & CHARLES SABATINO, COMMISSION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF THE ELDERLY, MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERY UNDER OBRA'93, PICKING THE BONES
OF THE POOR? (The American Bar Ass'n, Nov. 1994).
92. Although the Medicaid statute has always permitted states to utilize estate
recovery tactics and place liens on real property owned by a beneficiary at the time
of her death, prior to 1990 only twelve states had any kind of estate recovery
program, and these were rarely enforced. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERY 2 (Thomson/MEDSTAT, Apr. 2005), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/estaterec.pdf [hereinafter MEDICAID ESTATE
RECOVERY].
93. Id.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p.
94. "OBRA '93 requires states to recover, at a minimum, all property and assets
that pass from a deceased person to his or her heirs under state probate law, which
governs both property conveyed by will and property of persons who die intestate.
A state's ability to recover from probate estates depends in some measure on
Medicaid's standing vis- -vis other claimants. The order of payment of debt is
established under state law. Mortgages, unpaid tax or public utility bills, child
support arrears, burial costs, or other debts may be paid before the Medicaid lien
and reduce the amount that is actually recovered. The State's standing is also
influenced by locally determined state priorities. For example, some state laws
protect the family home in an estate from some or all claims against it, including
Medicaid claims." See MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERY, supra note 92.
95. Id.
96. Michigan has recently adopted OBRA 93's mandate. See MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 400.112g (2007).
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states.9 7 Some states, such as Minnesota, have been extremely
aggressive in enforcing estate recovery, going as far as to
redefine fundamental concepts of property law for the purposes
of Medicaid estate recovery, by treating "assets" that historically
have had no value at the owner's death (such as a life estate) as
having marketable worth for the sole purpose of asserting an
estate recovery claim against the phantom asset.98  Estate
recovery has nothing to do with Medicaid eligibility. The
victims of estate recovery are the families and heirs of persons
who were legally entitled to benefits because of severe
disabilities and the limited income and assets. OBRA '93's estate
recovery mandate reflects a political judgment that persons with
disabilities should not enjoy the benefit of "broadly held cultural
values on the sanctity of intergenerational legacies." 9
Medicaid estate recovery, as contemplated by the language
of section 13612 and now enforced in most states, has no
counterpart among similar taxpayer-funded programs having a
limited class of beneficiaries. Medicare enrollees, for example,
do not become subject to estate recovery because they (or more
specifically, those who provide them with health care) tap into
the Health Insurance Trust Fund and general federal revenues
due to acute illnesses or injury. The parents of public school
children do not become liable to pay back to the state the value
of the education those children received at taxpayers' expense.
Homeowners are not subject to "mortgage deduction recovery
liens" that require them to repay the government the value of
the tax benefits derived from the federal tax code's mortgage
interest deduction they receive if they sell property that is the
source of those tax benefits. Only members of our society who
are disabled, those who happen to develop a disabling condition
or disease in their later years, are deemed so undeserving of
97. In 2004, about $361 million was collected through the states' estate recovery
efforts. This represents less than .8% of total Medicaid spending on institutional-
level care in that year. These millions were paid by the family members of disabled
seniors who were denied all or a portion of their inheritance. See id.
98. MINN. STAT. § 256B.15 (2006).
99. MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERY, supra note 92, at 8.
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taxpayer support that it is considered reasonable to strip their
estates of any value they might have after they die. One can
imagine the uproar that would ensue if legislators sought to
ensure Medicare's future solvency through a federal estate
recovery scheme. Medicaid estate recovery is tolerated not
because of its inherent reasonableness, but because it pertains
only to seniors with disabilities, whom politicians and voters
hold in so little regard that a policy of estate recovery can be
portrayed as legitimate.
WATCHING SAUSAGE BEING MADE
In the decade following OBRA '93, special interest groups
such as the long-term care industry and conservative "think
tanks" bent on cutting entitlement programs across the board,
convinced state and federal legislators that "Medicaid
millionaires" around the country, with the help of their elder
law attorneys, were unethically (though legally) shifting large
amounts of assets to their heirs and others in order to qualify for
the Medicaid program. 0 The available empirical evidence
regarding pre-Medicaid application transfers of assets belies the
myth of the Medicaid millionaire. The Government
Accountability Office itself has concluded that asset transfers
made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid have virtually
no impact on Medicaid expenditures.101 One study found that
100. E.g., Editorial, Medicaid for Millionaires, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2005, at A14;
JAMES R. CANTWELL, UNITED STATES HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET,
REFORMING MEDICAID NCPA POLICY REPORT NO. 197 (Nat'l Ctr. for Policy
Analysis, 1995), available at http://ncpa.org/studies/sl97/sl97.html.
101. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID LONG-TERM CARE: FEW
TRANSFERRED ASSETS BEFORE APPLYING FOR NURSING HOME COVERAGE; IMPACT OF
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT ON ELIGIBILITY IS UNCERTAIN GAO-07-280 7 (Mar. 2007),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07280.pdf. Despite this finding, the
Ctr. for Medicare and Medicaid Svc. continues to cultivate the fallacy of self-
impoverishment, maintaining on its website, "Some individuals, with assistance
from financial planners and attorneys, have developed methods of arranging assets
in such a way that they are preserved for the individual and/or family members,
but are not countable when Medicaid eligibility is determined. Various techniques
are used to artificially impoverish Medicaid applicants, including gifting of assets to
family members, investing assets in financial instruments that are inaccessible, and
executing financial transactions for which fair market value is not actually
38 [Vol. 9
DRA'S IMPACT ON SENIORS
only about eighteen percent of Medicaid beneficiaries
transferred any assets prior to their admission to a nursing home
and estimated the median value of pre-application transfers to
be $2800.102 Nevertheless, Congress bought into the specter of
the "Medicaid millionaire"; the DRA is one result of its
gullibility.
The DRA made two significant changes in the asset-
transfer-penalty structure implemented through OBRA '93
whose purposes are (1) to further discourage disabled elderly
persons from gifting and making other transfers at less than fair
market value; and (2) to punish those who do. First, section 6011
increased the look-back period during which asset transfers
were treated as suspect from three to five years.103 More
important, this section mandates aggregation of asset transfers
made within the five years preceding application for medical
assistance1 0 and calculation of a penalty period based on the
total sum of those transfers. This penalty period begins to run,
not from the date that each transfer was made (or even from the
date on which the most recent transfer was made), but from the
later of the date of the transfer or the date on which the disabled
applicant would otherwise be eligible for benefits.105 In most
cases, this means that the penalty period does not start until the
person applies for, and is determined to be, income and asset
eligible for benefits, and has a need for long-term care.
WHO REALLY PAYS FOR THE LONG-TERM CARE OF ELDERS WITH
DISABILITIES?
A commonly cultivated misperception is that Medicaid is
received." CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT,
TRANSFER OF ASSETS, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DeficitReductionAct
/10 TOA.asp.
102. ASSET TRANSFER AND NURSING HOME USE, supra note 73, at 5.
103. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p (Westlaw current through Sept. 26, 2007).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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the principal source of long-term care financing for the disabled
elderly.106 This is not the case. The Congressional Budget Office
estimated in 2004 that only twenty-two percent of all long-term
care provided to the elderly seniors is paid for through the
Medicaid program. 07 In fact, Medicare and Medicaid combined
account for only thirty-eight percent of the nation's total long-
term care expenditures for services required by disabled
elders.08 Sixty percent of long-term care costs are paid from
private sources, including out of pocket expenditures by those in
need of care.109 The largest single source of financing of long-
term care for the nation's seniors is not Medicaid, Medicare, or
even out-of-pocket payments by those receiving care and their
families (averaging about $5000/year per senior), but rather the
informal, unpaid care giving provided to the elderly by their
immediate and extended family members or other unpaid
caregivers.o10 Most of these informal caregivers are women.
Caregivers sacrifice hundreds of billions of dollars each year in
income and related employment benefits as the opportunity cost
of providing unpaid care to relatives. The direct contribution of
informal, unpaid care giving accounted for thirty-six percent of
total long-term care expenditures for the elderly in 2004.111 One
106. On the other hand, a significant majority of seniors believe that Medicare
pays for nursing home care. See, e.g., THE COSTS OF LONG-TERM CARE: PUBLIC
PERCEPTION VERSUS REALITY IN 2006 30 (AARP 2006).
107. FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY, supra note 62, at 3. Long-
term care accounted for 35% of total Medicaid expenditures in federal FY 2004.
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 2004 STATE AND NATIONAL MEDICAID SPENDING
DATA TABLES 2 AND 2A, available at http://kff.org/medicaid/kcmu032406oth.cfm.
108. FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY, supra note 63, at 3.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also Peter Arno et al., The Economic Value of Informal Caregiving, 18
HEALTH AFFAIRS 184 (1999), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/
18/2/182.pdf.
111. FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY, supra note 62, at 3. This
estimate of the value of unpaid, informal care is based on valuing the work of
caregivers at about $10/hour, which is considerably less than the actual market
value of in-home long-term care. "According to the most comprehensive survey of
home health costs, the average hourly charge in 2006 for homemaker services was
$17.09 and $25.32 for home health aides. . . 'certified' home care providers charge
even more-an average of $36.22 per hour for home health aides." Retirement
Planning's Greatest Gap, supra note 62, at 412. Nor does this figure include the
opportunity cost of caregiving to caregiver, future losses of pension and social
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study has estimated that the availability of family caregivers
saves the federal government between $257 billion annually. 112
In addition, those who have access to unpaid care giving tend to
delay entering a nursing home.
Medicaid's role in financing long-term care for elders with
disabilities, while significant, falls far short of the role that these
elders and their families already play. By the time the average
senior with a disability applies for Medicaid, he or she and
family have already spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on
his or her care through the value of their labor, their out-of-
pocket expenditures, and the indirect loss to the caregivers of
wages and benefits such as pension contributions and future
Social Security payments. The pre-DRA eligibility standards for
Medicaid provided means to deter these seniors from "hiding
assets"; estate recovery guarantees that the state will get
anything left over after a beneficiary dies. Unsatisfied with the
contribution that was already being made by seniors with
disabilities and their families to the national expenditures on
long-term care, supporters of the DRA decided to impose
additional burdens on these taxpayers. The next section
contends that such a strategy is unjust.
Most feminist legal scholars would maintain that a law or
legal practice might be considered just only to the extent that it
does not particularly disadvantage women (as compared to
men) in its application and consequences. Similarly, disability
rights theorists contend that laws and policies must be ability-
neutral to be legitimate."' As has been discussed above, this
security benefits by caregivers, or the costs of caregiving on the caregivers' mental
and physical health. When these are considered, the actual contribution of unpaid
caregivers to the national economy is estimated at to be more than the entire budget
of Medicare. See, e.g., FAMILY CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, SELECTED CAREGrVER
STATISTICs, available at http://www.caregiver.org/caregiver/jsp/content-node.jsp?no
deid=439 [hereinafter FAMILY CAREGIVER ALLIANCE].
112. FAMILY CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, supra note 111.
113. There are differences among feminist and disability rights scholars in the
particulars of their jurisprudential claims and the remedies they would make
available to rectify pervasive gender and discrimination embedded in law and
policy. In this article, my goal is primarily to expose the DRA's general
discriminatory character rather than propose a particular remedies (other than
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nation's current long-term care financing scheme already
imposes its greatest burdens on women and persons with
disabilities. The lack of a long-term care benefit in Medicare
means family members (spouses first, then daughters) are very
likely to present the first line of defense when an older person
with a severe disability can not perform essential activities of
daily living. The asset transfer penalty and estate recovery work
together to shift the cost of taxpayer-financed care back onto
seniors and their immediate families. To the extent that the
DRA transfers even greater economic, social, and emotional
costs (for all of these are implicit in the DRA's key "cost-saving"
measures), primarily to women or elders with disabilities, or
both, the statute cannot be considered an acceptable solution to
the alleged crisis it is intended to address.
Two aspects of the DRA in particular are illustrative of why
the DRA is unjust from both feminist and disability rights
perspectives. The first is section 6011(b), which directs states to
change the start date for calculating the asset transfer penalty
provision from the date of the transfer to the date on which a
Medicaid applicant has "applie[d] and is otherwise eligible for"
medical assistance benefits.114  The second is section 6021,115
which permits states to establish so-called "Long-term Care
repeal) aimed at correcting its deficiencies. For discussions of the varieties of
feminist jurisprudence, see PATRICIA SMITH, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (Oxford
1992). For a good summary of the principal tenets of feminist jurisprudence, see
Kellye Y. Testy, Capitalism and Freedom - for Whom?: Feminist Legal Theory and
Progressive Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 94-95 (2004). For
discussions of disability theory in law, see, e.g., ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY,
DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, PERSPECrIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 1998); Theodore P. Seto & Sande L.
Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1053 (2006).
114. "In the case of a transfer of asset made on or after the date of the enactment
of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, the date specified in this subparagraph is the
first day of a month during or after which assets have been transferred for less than
fair market value, or the date on which the individual is eligible for medical
assistance under the State plan and would otherwise be receiving institutional level
care described in subparagraph (C) based on an approved application for such care
but for the application of the penalty period, whichever is later, and which does not
occur during any other period of ineligibility under this subsection." See 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396p(c)(1)(D)(ii) (Westlaw current through Sept. 26, 2007).
115. See § 1396p(b).
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Insurance Partnerships" with private insurance companies and
in so doing privilege certain Medicaid applicants against all
others in determining eligibility for state and federal benefits.
For somewhat different reasons, neither of these components of
the DRA can survive a feminist or disability-rights critique.
PENALTY START DATE AT DATE OF APPLICATION
As discussed earlier, Medicaid eligibility is based on both
income and assets. While asset transfer penalties have applied
to Medicaid applicants for many years, the DRA transforms the
Medicaid penalty provision from a deterrent to a harsh, mean-
spirited punishment on one particular class of elders: those with
severe disabilities. This point is illustrated by comparing how
the pre- and post-DRA penalty provision would operate in a
particular situation.
Recall that, under OBRA '93, the asset transfer penalty
period is determined by reference to individual (not cumulative)
transfers, and begins to run on the first day of the month after
the transfer. Suppose that Mary (age seventy-two) regularly
tithed ten percent of her monthly income of $1000,116 and made a
gift on May 15 of $5000 to her grandson Tommy upon his
graduation from college (from money she had received when
her sister recently died). If the transfer penalty divisor in her
state of residence were $4000, Mary's gift to her grandson would
result in a period of ineligibility for Medicaid of 1.25 months,
beginning on June 1 (or until July 8). Each gift of $100 to her
church would result in a penalty period of $100/$4000, or less
than one day. If Mary was neither receiving nor anticipating a
need for institutional level care or Medical assistance at the time
she made the transfers, and does not need it before July 8, her
ultimate eligibility for program benefits will not be impaired.
116. The average annual income of a sixty-plus single woman in the United
States is about $13,000/year. JANET C. GORNICK ET AL., LUXEMBOURG INCOME
STUDY, OLDER WOMEN'S INCOME AND WEALTH PACKAGES: THE FIVE-LEGGED STOOL
IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2006), available at http://www-cpr.maxwell.syr.
edu/faculty/smeeding/pdf/OlderWomensIncome.pdf.
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Even if Mary already has a disability that could potentially
result in a future need for long-term care, she (and her family)
could effectively plan for the possibility that she will need to
apply for public benefits. Mary, though she has disabilities, is
not deprived of the opportunity to contribute to her church and
community or support and reward a cherished grandchild. She
can plan for the possibility that she will need institutional-level
care, while retaining prerogatives given those who do not face a
potential need for long-term care to be generous and support
institutions and causes in which they believe.
In contrast, under the DRA, Mary's decision to tithe and to
make a gift to her grandson will have serious consequences
should her condition deteriorate to the point that she needs
long-term care within the next five years. Under the amended
penalty provisions of the Medicaid statute, assume Mary gives
$100 a month to her church for the sixty months preceding her
application for Medicaid (a total of $6000), and $2000 to each of
her four grandchildren at some point during those sixty months
as well. If the penalty divisor is $4000, her "transfers" of $14,000
will result in a penalty period of 3.5 months, which will begin
only after approval of Mary's application for long-term care
benefits. Assuming that Mary has moved into the nursing home
while her application for benefits is pending, issues will likely
arise regarding who can/will pay for her care during the 3.5
months in which she is ineligible for state benefits. Since the
cost of care is likely to be considerably greater than the $4000
divisor used to calculate the penalty period, Mary, or her family
members, will need to find some source of payment, or, more
likely, attempt to provide long-term care for Mary themselves
during the period that she has become ineligible for benefits.
Thus, a family that has already borne the great bulk of
Mary's long-term care costs, through their provision of unpaid
care giving and their payment of her out-of-pocket costs each
year for many years, will spend still more due to the penalty
period. Although nursing homes stand to lose much from
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enforcement of the penalty,"7 Mary and her family members
will ultimately pay not only the financial costs of Mary's
"unethical" conduct, but also the emotional and physical costs
that are inevitable if Mary is evicted from the facility for non-
payment. The penalty provision deprives Mary of her personal
dignity and punishes her for "irresponsible" support of her
church and grandchildren. Ultimately, it sends a powerful
message to persons with disabilities about the value of their
contributions to our society. The position of those supporting
the DRA is essentially that "Mary should have planned for this"
and should be disciplined for failing to do so. It is irrelevant to
the DRA's supporters that Mary and her family have already
paid the vast majority of the cost of her care and that the
"savings" that will result from application of the penalty start
date are borne entirely by Mary and other elders with
disabilities like hers.
Proponents of the revised penalty period start date note that
the DRA codified a CMS policy, generally referred to as
Transmittal 64, which required states to waive the Medicaid
asset transfer penalty if application of the penalty would work
"undue hardship" 18 on an institutionalized beneficiary. The
114. The DRA has been called "The Nursing Home Bankruptcy Act of 2006" with
good reason. See The Coulson Law Group, Nursing Homes and the New Medicaid
Eligibility Rules, MEDICAID PLANNING TODAY, May 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.qualifyformedicaid.com/NewsletterVol2Iss3.pdf. Some sixty percent
of all long-term care facilities stand to lose federal Medicaid payments as a result of
the longer look back period and the application date forward principle. However,
other federal laws preclude institutions from discharging a resident until an
adequate discharge plan is in place. Such a plan must include alternative living
and/or long-term care arrangements. When a resident has few or no resources
available to pay for care, the facility may find itself without a speedy means to
discharge the resident; when discharge does occur, it tends to be to a hospital
emergency room or other facility not equipped to provide long-term care.
118. In November 1994, the Health Care Financing Administration (CMS's
nominal predecessor) issued a policy statement referred to as "Transmittal 64."
Transmittal 64 was intended to amplify OBRA '93's directives pertaining to liens,
transfers, and estate recovery. To that end, it directed states to develop, describe in
their State Medicaid Plans, and implement hardship waiver procedures pertaining
to asset transfers, as follows:
Undue Hardship Defined.--Undue hardship exists when application of the
transfer of assets provisions would deprive the individual of medical care
such that his/her health or his/her life would be endangered. Undue
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hardship exemption, it is suggested, provides a safety net for
persons such as Mary who may have made prohibited transfers
not knowing of the long-term consequences of their actions.
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the DRA's hardship provision
will offer significant relief to individuals who are similarly
situated to Mary. The Medicaid statute contains a presumption
that all asset transfers are presumed to have been made for the
purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. The states have been
zealous in their allegiance to that presumption, some going as
far as to re-codify it in state law. It is virtually impossible to
identify the standards that states are using to administer the
hardship waiver provision; as noted, decisions concerning
Medicaid eligibility are usually made at the county level by state
employees who have very little accountability for their actions.
It may be safe to speculate, however, that the states' position on
transfers of any kind made by persons with disabilities is that
the hardship waiver cannot apply to such transfers inasmuch an
elderly person who has a manifest disability should expect to
need long-term care and should be saving her assets, not giving
them away. The only individuals who are likely to have any
chance of benefiting from the hardship waiver are persons who
have neither symptoms of a disabling disease, or known risk of
developing a severe disability, such as a completely healthy
person who experiences an acute condition such as a brain stem
hardship also exists when application of the transfer of assets provisions
would deprive the individual of food, clothing, shelter, or other necessities
of life. Undue hardship does not exist when application of the transfer of
assets provisions merely causes the individual inconvenience or when
such application might restrict his or her lifestyle but would not put
him/her at risk of serious deprivation.
Health Care Fin. Admin., Transmittal No. 64 (Nov. 1994), available at
http://www.elderlawanswers.com/resources/documents/Transmittal64Sec3258.
pdf.
The DRA codified this aspect of Transmittal 64, but does not articulate particular
criteria to be used in evaluating "hardship." See id. Because the Medicaid statute
contains a presumption that any uncompensated transfer made during the
applicable look-back period was made for the purpose of obtaining Medicaid
eligibility, hardship waivers were rarely granted under Transmittal 64, and there is
no evidence suggesting that states are being more generous after enactment of the
DRA.
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stroke or a traumatic brain injury. For the most part, such a
standard will exclude the vast majority of seniors from
consideration for the hardship waiver.
In short, the new penalty provisions of the DRA create a
punitive restriction on access to publicly financed long-term care
that applies only to seniors with disabilities. This select group,
which already bears most of the explicit and implicit costs of
long-term care, is now accountable for another six billion dollars.
At the same time, pharmaceutical companies are receiving
billions in federal taxpayer subsidies in connection with the
Medicare Part D benefit. Such an approach to long-term care
financing "reform" is unacceptable.
LONG-TERM CARE PARTNERSHIPS UNDER THE DRA
[L]ong-term care insurance is not like Medicare, which
accepts all enrollees who meet its age and work
experience requirements. Instead, long-term care
insurance is a private market product and therefore
subject to whatever medical underwriting criteria that a
private insurer wishes to employ to limit its cost
exposure." 9
One highly touted provision of the DRA is its codification of
the prerogative of states to allow asset sheltering by persons
who purchase qualified long-term care insurance policies.
Unlike other aspects of the DRA, the long-term care partnerships
contemplated by the DRA will not save taxpayers anything for
the near future. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that
the long-term care partnership provision of the DRA will
actually cost taxpayers eighty-six million dollars over the next
ten years.12 0 The DRA confers its asset-sheltering benefit only on
persons who can and do buy long-term care insurance. Because
this benefit is not available on a non-discriminatory basis, this
aspect of the DRA must also be considered unjust.
119. Retirement Planning's Greatest Gap, supra note 64, at 436.
120. S. 1932, DEFIcrr REDUCTION ACT OF 2005, supra note 4, at 36.
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A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE
INDUSTRYT21
Long-term care insurance (LTCI) is a relatively new
insurance product. There are nearly 200 licensed companies in
at least one state to sell policies, but the market is highly
concentrated-six companies control more than seventy percent
of the market based on premiums paid.122 In the early days of its
marketing LTCI was significantly under-priced and not
sufficiently "exclusive." 123 Not surprisingly, rates have gone up
precipitously in recent years, and insurers and underwriters
vigorously pre-screen potential applicants. Recent reports in the
popular press suggest that some companies are denying as
many as one in four LTCI claims made against older policies,
and in May of this year, the industry became the subject of a
congressional investigation due to news stories in the popular
press reporting that some insurers were routinely denying
legitimate claims.124
LTCI policies can vary widely in terms of the benefits
offered and other factors. Differences among policies include
the aggregate amount of the benefit, whether it is paid daily,
monthly, or as an accumulated benefit, what event(s) will trigger
entitlement to the policy benefit, the elimination period,125
whether home or assisted living care is covered by the policy,
121. See, e.g., Retirement Planning's Greatest Gap, supra note 64, at 430-47.
122. Alfred Clapp, Jr., Long-term Care Insurance, THE CPA JOURNAL (Sept. 2003),
available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2003/0903/features/f094003.htm.
123. See, e.g., Sara Hansford, Obama, Clinton call for investigation into LTC abuses,
INVESTMENT NEws, Apr. 16, 2007, available at http://www.investmentnews.com
/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070416/FREE/70412010/-1/INIssueAlert4.
124. Large employers shopping for group policies presumably have access to
somewhat better information for purposes of comparing policy costs and benefits.
125. The elimination period is the number of days of long-term care that must be
paid for from other sources before the policy begins to pay-typically, ninety days.
Only 1.4% of persons aged sixty-five to seventy-four and 6% of persons aged
seventy-five to eighty-four will stay in a facility more than ninety days. MONTANA
DEP'T OF INS., LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE GUIDE 2, available at http://sao.mt.
gov/seniors/GuideLongTermCare.pdf.
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and whether and how much inflation protection is offered. 126
Policies sold in the 1990s rarely covered care provided elsewhere
than in a skilled nursing facility, but nowadays a broader array
of benefits may be available-for a price. Premiums vary
significantly among policies, and it can be difficult to be an
informed consumer when considering what policy to buy.127
Companies do not make rate information readily available in a
form that facilitates comparison-shopping by potential
individual applicants.128
Employer-sponsored group policies, which are an option
for just six percent of American workers, 129 are less expensive
than policies available to individuals. Thus, a healthy fifty-five
year-old state employee who has access to group long-term care
insurance plan might expect to pay about $2400 annually for a
policy offering a $200/day, inflation-protected benefit for three
years.3 0 A similarly situated individual buying a policy might
have a premium that is 50% to 100% more. Pricing estimates
126. For good discussions of the vagaries of a long-term care insurance policy
that will affect the premium, see Retirement Planning's Greatest Gap, supra note 64;
NAT'L AsS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, CONSUMER ALERT: LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE.:
WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW, available at http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer
alert Itc.htm.
127. See, e.g., FED. CONSUMER INFO. CTR., GUIDE TO LONG-TERM CARE (LTC)
INSURANCE 5, 7 (2004), available at http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic-text/health/Itc
/guide.htm: "In 2002, a policy offering a $150 per day long-term care benefit for
four years, with a ninety-day deductible, cost a fifty year old a national average of
$564 per year. For someone who was sixty-five years old, the national average cost
was $1,337, and for a seventy-nine year old, the national average cost was $5,330.
The same policy with an inflation protection feature cost, on average nationally,
$1,134 at age fifty, $2,346 at age sixty-five, and $7,572 at age seventy-nine. Please
note that these are only national averages. The cost of long-term care varies
significantly by state. For the cost of care and coverage in your area, check with a
representative of a long-term care insurer, an insurance agent, or financial adviser."
See also, Beware of Long-term Care Insurance Cost Comparisons, PR
NEWSWIRE/INSURANCE NEWS NET, Jun. 2007, http://www.send2press.com/
newswire/2007-06-0613-003.shtml (last viewed Sept. 17, 2007).
128. See Retirement Planning's Greatest Gap, supra note 64, at 449-50.
129. INS. INFO. INST., FACTS AND STATISTICS: LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE,
http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/longtermcare/ (last visited Oct. 11,
2007).
130. This estimate is based on the on-line LTCI rate estimator made available to
California state employees who are part of the California Public Employee
Retirement System. See Long-Term Care Monthly Rates Calculator, http://www.cal
pers.ca.gov/jasper.mi/ltc-rates/Itccalculator.jsp.
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from publicly available sources are generally based on industry
data that are several years old. In short, it is nearly impossible to
articulate an "average" monthly or cost for long-term care
insurance.
Policies that contain inflation protection are almost twice as
expensive as those without it. A carrier can usually increase
rates on existing policies for all members of a "class" of insureds
when such an increase is reasonable, as determined by the state
regulatory agency.131 Loss ratios (the percentage of total
premiums collected that are paid out to policyholders who
collect on their policies) appear to be substantially lower than in
other sectors of the insurance market. 132 The need for the type of
services typically insured by a long-term care policy does not
generally arise until the policyholder moves well into old age
and develops disabilities requiring a relatively intense level of
chronic or custodial care.
HISTORY OF THE "PARTNERSHIP" CONCEPT
The DRA's long-term care insurance partnership provisions
are modeled after a demonstration program originally funded
by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and approved by the
Health Care Financing Administration (CMS's predecessor). 3 3
131. See Mila Kofman & Lee Thompson, Issue Brief: Consumer Protection and Long-
term Care Insurance: Predictability of Premiums, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LONG-
TERM CARE FINANCING PROJECT 3, 5 (March 2004), available at http://tc.george
town.edu/pdfs
/consumer.pdf.
132. Industry-wide loss ratios for long-term care insurance are about 59%. See
Judith Feder, Harriet L. Komisar, & Robert B. Friedland, Long-Term Care Financing:
Policy Options for The Future (June 2007) http://Itc.georgetown.edu/forum/tcfinal
paper061107.pdf. Loss ratios on traditional health insurance typically range as high
at 89%. See Statement of N.Y. State Ins. Dept. before N.Y. State Senate Standing
Comm't on Insurance, April 15, 2003, Testimony by Gregory V. Serio, Super. of Ins.
N.Y. State Ins. Dept., http://www.ins.state.ny.us/speeches/pdf/ty030415.pdf.
133. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., PROGRAM TO PROMOTE LONG-TERM CARE
INSURANCE FOR THE ELDERLY, GRANT RESULTS (updated July 2007), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/reports/npreports/elderlye.htm [hereinafter PROGRAM TO
PROMOTE LTCI]; ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, LONG-TERM CARE PARTNERSHIPS:
AN UPDATE (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.allhealth.org/publications/Long-
termcare/LongTerm CarePartnerships 53.pdf [ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM].
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In 1987, the Foundation awarded grants for long-term care
partnership pilot projects in California, Connecticut, Indiana,
and New York. 34 The purpose of the pilots was to determine if
consumers would purchase long-term care insurance if assured
that the purchase of such insurance would allow them to shelter
assets from the reach of state medical assistance administrators.
The first partnership policies were sold in 1992.135 In 1993,
HCFA placed a moratorium on other state partnership programs
until the results of the pilot programs could be assessed.136
Between 1992 and 2006, almost 250,000 partnership policies
were sold in the four pilot states. 37 Of these, about eighty
percent were in force in mid-2006; the remainder had lapsed due
to non-payment of premiums, death of the policyholder, or for
other reasons. 38 Over that fourteen year period, fewer than two
percent of these policyholders (3822) accessed their long-term
care benefits.139  Perhaps more important, only 175 policy
holders (two percent of those who were able to use their policies
to pay for long-term care) had both exhausted their long-term
care insurance benefit and gone on to qualify for Medicaid.4'
That is, of all the long-term care insurance partnership policies
sold in the pilot states, only .0008% reaped the purported
134. See U.S. GEN. ACTG. OFFICE, LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: PARTNERSHIP
PROGRAMS INCLUDE BENEFITS THAT PROTECT POLICYHOLDERS AND ARE UNLIKELY
TO RESULT IN MEDICAID SAVINGS GAO-07-231 1 (May 2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07231.pdf [hereinafter GAO PARTNERSHIP
PROGRAMS].
135. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE:
CONNECTICUT'S PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP HAS STEADY GROWTH (Jan. 2007),
available at http://www.rwjf.org/pr/product.jsp?id=18002&topicid=1094.
136. See generally HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., MEDICARE HOME HEALTH
MORATORIUM IS LIFTED: NEW RULES AND PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED TO STOP FRAUD
AND ABUSE (Jan. 1998), available at http://www.hhs.gov/new/press/1998pres
/980113a.html (explaining that moratorium's were going to be lifted).
137. GAO PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS, supra note 134, at 18.
138. LTCI is a "lapse driven" type of insurance-that is, companies expect to reap
a significant portion of their profit from premiums paid by persons who allow the
policy to lapse before they ever collect a benefit. See John L. Timmerberg, Improving
the Profitability of In-Force, Long-Term-Care Insurance. Policies, CONTINGENCIES, Sept.-
Oct. 2005, http://www.contingencies.org/sepoct05/Tradecraft_0905.asp (last visited
Sept. 15, 2007).
139. ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, supra note 133.
140. Id.
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"advantage" offered by partnership policies of sheltering assets
from the reach of the Medicaid program. In other words, some
ninety-eight percent of those who bought long-term care
insurance policies under the auspices of a LTCP never needed
their policies or have yet to access them, and 99.9992% of them
either never applied for Medicaid or were otherwise ineligible
for it despite their purchase of a policy that allowed them to
exclude substantial amounts of assets. Long-term care insurers
collected billions in premiums on these taxpayer-subsidized
policies. A study sponsored by the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation concluded that seventy percent of those who
purchased Partnership Policies would have done so even
without the promise of asset protection.141
It is against this backdrop that a variety of special interest
groups led by the long-term care industryl 42 persuaded
Congress to authorize all fifty states to implement partnerships
through the DRA.143  Section 6012 permits the states to allow
persons who have bought "qualified" long-term care insurance
policies, and thereafter exhaust their benefits paying for long-
term care, to shelter assets of significant value and still become
eligible for Medicaid.'" Specifically, an individual who
141. PROGRAM TO PROMOTE LTCI, supra note 133, at 8.
142. The long-term care industry has characterized the Partnership provisions of
the DRA as "a gift from Uncle Sam." Victorson Assocs., Inc., Finally.. .A Gift from
Uncle Sam, http://www.victorson.com/1tc/Medicaid%20Planning%20is%2Dead.
htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
143. For general information on the DRA's LTCP provisions, see CTR. FOR
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., BACKGROUND ON LONG-TERM CARE
PARTNERSHIPS, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DeficitReductionAct/Down
oads/BackgrounderPartnership.pdf; CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT, LONG TERM CARE PARTNERSHIPS, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DeficitReductionAct/09_LTCPartnerships.asp#TopOfPage
144. While many provisions of the DRA impose mandatory obligations on the
states, the Long-term Care Partnership provision is optional. To effect a state
Partnership, the state must amend its state Medicaid eligibility requirements to
incorporate Partnership asset exemptions and obtain CMS approval of the amended
plan. Insurance is regulated primarily at the state level, and state insurance laws
and regulations may also be in need of modification before policies can be sold
under the auspices of the Partnership. For example, the state must develop internal
regulatory standards that comply with certain minimum standards for LTCI
partnership policies established in the DRA and its implementing regulations
(which are extremely minimal), and with the state's own insurance laws and
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purchases a qualifying long-term care insurance policy and then
later applies for Medicaid may exempt assets up to the value of
the long-term care benefit her policy encompasses in
determining the total value of her countable assets for purposes
of determining Medicaid eligibility. Thus, an individual who
buys a qualified Partnership policy that assures a $200,000 long-
term care benefit may exclude $200,000 in assets (rather than
only $2000 in assets) in addition to those assets already treated
as exempt or within allowable limits for purposes of calculating
the applicant's total assets and spend-down when she applies
for Medicaid at some remote future date. The value of these
assets is also off-limits from estate recovery. In essence, states
implementing this aspect of the DRA "reward" those who buy
long-term care policies with special privileges with respect to
retention of personal assets in the event they live long enough
and are poor enough to need Medicaid at some point in the
future.' 5 This privilege supplements the tax benefits and other
advantages that states and the federal government have already
implemented to encourage purchase of such policies. 146
Advocates of the DRA's long-term partnership provisions claim
that the program will save billions in Medicaid costs over the
next ten years. 147
regulations See, e.g., S.D. ADMIN. R. 20:06:21:02 (2002).
145. Many details of the Partnerships have yet to be worked out-among them,
portability of policies (that is, whether a Partnership policy purchased in one state
will entitle the beneficiary to the asset exemption in a different state) and what
measure of inflation protection individual states will mandate. To some extent,
these problems make it unlikely that LTCP policies will be available at all in many
states.
146. For example, the proceeds of a long-term care insurance policy are not
treated as income, and in most states, persons who buy long-term care insurance
are entitled to tax benefits such as deductions or credits for a portion of the
premium cost. See David Nixon, State Programs to Encourage Long-term Care
Insurance, Policy Paper #001, UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII AT MANOA, COLLEGE OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES PUBLIC POL'Y CTR. 1 (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.publicpolicy
center.hawaii.edu/documents/paper0Ol.pdf.
147. As of late May 2007, at least twenty states had LTCPs or had taken the first
steps towards amending their state plans to allow for them. See Long Term Care
Partnership, http://www.dehpg.net/LTCPartnership/map.aspx (last visited
December 18, 2007). These include four states-California, Connecticut, Indiana, and
New York-that were involved in a federally-authorized, privately funded pilot
program that began in the early 1990s, and at least twenty others that have obtained
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INEQUITIES OF THE LTCP PROGRAM
As noted, federal and state officials are working closely
with industry representatives to promote the sale of Partnership
Policies. Arguably misleading statistics48 scare laypersons into
thinking they need LTCI no matter what it costs. Tax revenues
are being used to support advertising campaigns that inure
directly-and almost exclusively-to the benefit of the insurance
industry. In truth, long-term care insurance products are not
available at all to the majority of older Americans for two
principal reasons. First, increasingly strict underwriting
standards make LTCI products completely off-limits to persons
who have a disability or are statistically likely to become
disabled. Employer sponsored group LTCI is a rarity, and is
exempt from federal requirements prohibiting discrimination by
health insurers based on pre-existing conditions.'49 Second,
LTCI is expensive and therefore not within the means of most
middle class Americans, many of whom cannot afford basic
health care insurance, much less long-term care policies.
Women in particular are unable to afford such policies, and are
more likely to be disqualified from purchasing them because of
their higher risks of developing conditions that are deemed
uninsurable.
CMS approval of state plan amendments and intend to roll out their programs by
the end of 2007. Id. "Fast track" states that anticipate entering into Long-term Care
Partnerships before the end of 2007 include Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. For background information on
the pilot LTCPs, see, e.g., ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, supra note 132; AARP
PUBLIC POLICY INST., FACT SHEET: LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE PARTNERSHIP
PROGRAMS (2006), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/fsl24_1tc_06.pdf.
148. See, e.g., ASSOC. OF HEALTH INS. ADVISORS, CONSUMER INFORMATION:
LONG-TERM CARE GUIDE (2006), available at http://www.ahia.net/consumer/guide
Itc.html#1ikely [hereinafter CONSUMER INFORMATION: LONG-TERM CARE GUIDE].
149. For general discussions of the federal laws and regulations governing the
employer-sponsored group health insurance, see, e.g., U.S DEP'T OF LABOR, AN
EMPLOYEE'S GUIDE TO HEALTH BENEFITS UNDER COBRA (reprinted Sept. 2006),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/cobraemployee.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
FACT SHEET: THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (Dec.
2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fshipaa.html.
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MYTHS ABOUT THE LONG-TERM CARE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM
At first blush, the LTCP seems to be a reasonable tradeoff:
states and the federal governments will achieve cost savings
because large numbers of middle class taxpayers will purchase
long-term care insurance that will cover their long-term care
expenses, thus reducing their need to take Medicaid benefits
away from the truly needy. Virtuous taxpayers-those who have
both the foresight and the integrity to purchase their own long-
term care insurance-will "own their futures"'50 and obtain
privileges that are not available to less-responsible citizens. Joint
promotional efforts by federal and state officials working closely
with industry representatives have created the impression that
everyone can and should buy long-term care insurance to avoid
future impoverishment and ensure access to public benefits in
the event that taxpayers need long-term care.
Unfortunately, the government's involvement in the
marketing of LTCP insurance lends legitimacy to an industry
that routinely misleads consumers and profits from legal
discrimination against persons with disabilities and women. For
example, insurance companies cite vague statistics 51 to scare
150. See generally CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OWN YOUR FUTURE:
PLANNING GUIDE FOR LONG-TERM CARE 3-7, 15-20, available at http://www.long
termcare.gov/LTC/Main_- Site/PlanningLTC/Campaign/Kit/index.aspx [hereinafter
OWN YOUR FUTURE]. The overarching thrust of the "Own Your Future" campaign
is that individuals should plan for their potential future need for long-term care by
purchasing long-term care insurance policies in the private market.
151. See, e.g., "More than half of the U.S. population will require some type of
long-term care during their lives-nursing home care, home health care, assisted
living facility care, or rehabilitation facility care. One out of five Americans over
the age of fifty is at risk of needing [long-term care] in the next 12 months."
CONSUMER INFORMATION: LONG-TERM CARE GUIDE, supra note 147. While it is true
that "more than half" of all persons now living will require some type of care in a
nursing home, the vast majority of these will need what I have dubbed "short-term
long-term care" that is currently reimbursed through the Medicare program.
Astonishingly, the federal government itself is involved in similar questionable
marketing tactics. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL
CLEARINGHOUSE FOR LONG-TERM CARE INFORMATION, available at http://www.lon
gtermcare.gov/LTC/Main TSite/index.aspx [hereinafter NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE]:
"[Alt least 60 percent of people over age 65 will require some long-term care
services at some point in their lives. And, contrary to what many people believe,
Medicare and private health insurance programs do not pay for the majority of
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laypersons into thinking they need LTCI no matter what it costs.
Whether these efforts will result in increased sales of the product
is debatable, as the pilot programs suggest. But a far more
important criticism of the partnerships is that long-term care
insurance products are not available at all to those who are most
likely to need them-persons with disabilities, and older women
who lack both the resources and the "qualifications" that will
enable them to purchase long-term care insurance. As discussed
above, this is because increasingly strict underwriting standards
make LTCI products off-limits to persons who have a disability
or are statistically likely to become disabled, and because LTCI
is expensive and therefore not within the means of most middle
class Americans. Employer sponsored group LTC, still
expensive but somewhat less so than individual policies, is a
rarity, and is exempt from federal requirements prohibiting
discrimination based on pre-existing conditions.
THE DRA DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT LTCI BE AVAILABLE TO ALL
I contend that the Long-term Care Partnership as a
Medicaid cost-saving device is just only to the extent that it
creates a benefit available to all taxpayers irrespective of gender
or disability. Neither the DRA nor the state mechanisms now
being designed to implement and promote the partnerships
impose any mandate on the industry to sell policies to particular
persons. State laws regulating the sale of long-term care
insurance, including Partnership policies, do not prohibit
discrimination against persons with disabilities by LTCI sellers
and underwriters. Federal laws that forbid discrimination
against persons with pre-existing conditions in group health
insurance do not apply to long-term care policies. 152 Almost
long-term care services that most people need - help with personal care such as
dressing or using the bathroom independently." Id.
152. As one article on the tax benefits of LTCI for "business owners and key
executives" put it, "HIPAA Legislation in 1996 created generous incentives for
business owners to purchase LTCI for themselves, [their] spouses and/or their key
executives .. . discrimination ('carve out') is allowed." Steve Cain, Long-Term Care
Planning: Tax Advantages for Business Owners and Key Executives, TODAY'S ENGINEER
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universally, underwriting standards preclude the sale of LTCI
policies to persons with even the most minor of disabilities. This
is not simply a matter of setting higher premiums for those who
have an identifiable condition that could result in a need for
long-term care at some future date. Rather, companies simply
will not insure disabled persons. Indeed, Professor Kaplan noted
recently that some twenty-five percent of all persons sixty-five
and older (who have a disability) are not eligible for LTCI under
current medical underwriting requirements.153
Most older individuals who require institutional-level long-
term care have one of three conditions: Alzheimer's disease,
diabetes, or disabilities resulting from a stroke. 154
Coincidentally, a person who has experienced any one of these
is categorically ineligible to purchase LTCI:
This list of uninsurable conditions has been created to
assist you with prescreening prior to referring a
proposed insured to a Long-term Care Insurance
Specialist. Do not refer anyone who currently: (1)
requires assistance with any one of the six activities of
daily living (bathing, dressing, feeding, toileting,
continence, transferring from bed to chair); (2) requires
assistance with any basic activity of daily living (e.g.
grocery shopping, use of transportation, use of
telephone, banking); (3) uses care services (e.g. home
health, nursing home or adult day care); [or] (4) uses a
walker, multi-pronged cane, crutches, or wheelchair. 155
Agents are also warned not to refer anyone who has or has
ONLINE, May 2006, available at http://www.todaysengineer.org/2006/May/LTC.asp.
153. Retirement Planning's Greatest Gap, supra note 64, at 436.
154. See CHANGES IN CHARACrERISTICS, supra note 62.
155. Sun Life Financial, Sun Long-Term Care Insurance - Underwriting
overview for referring partners, http://tinyurl.com/23m3xk (last visited Oct. 21,
2007) [hereinafter Sun Life Financial]. "Your health does not have to be perfect to
purchase long-term care insurance; however, there are certain health conditions and
combinations of health conditions that can cause you to be uninsurable. Sample of
Uninsurable Conditions: Alzheimer's Disease, Parkinson's, Multiple Sclerosis,
Dementia, Stroke, Cirrhosis of the Liver, Congestive Heart Failure, Diabetes with
complications, AIDS, current limitations with activities of daily living, use of
walker, wheelchair or quad cane, Muscular Dystrophy, oxygen use, severe arthritis
limiting activities." See also, e.g., AM Warner Insurance, Do You Even Qualify for
Long-term Care Insurance?, http://www.amwarnerinsurance.comdo-you-qualify.
html (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
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ever had, AIDS or HIV infection, Alzheimer's disease,
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), cystic fibrosis, dementia,
diabetes, hemophilia, hepatitis (C, non-A, non-B, or
autoimmune), kidney failure, liver cirrhosis; memory loss,
multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, paralysis, Parkinson's
disease, post polio syndrome, schizophrenia, sickle cell anemia,
or lupus.15 6 Individuals with a history of alcohol or drug abuse,
or individuals who have had a recent heart attack or stroke, are
also usually precluded from obtaining coverage. 57
Not a single state in the country has a long-term care
insurance high-risk pool that makes coverage available to those
who are unable to obtain it in the private market. In short,
persons with disabling conditions or even a family history of
diseases will not be able to buy LTCI policies (even though they
and their families are paying taxes to support the federal and
state governments' promotion of the Partnerships). This market
reality particularly affects women and minorities, who are more
likely than white males to have or develop disqualifying
conditions such as Alzheimer's, diabetes, and cardiovascular
disease and are significantly more likely to need long-term care
during their lifetimes.'58 Even assuming that the LTCI will cut
Medicaid costs substantially over the long haul-a doubtful
proposition at best-is such a policy one that taxpayers should be
required to support financially? Is it one that our state officials
should be permitted to promote as special agents for the private
insurance industry? To the extent that long-term care insurance
is a solution to an impending crisis in the long-term care arena,
such insurance should be available without regard to existing
disability, a la Medicare or group health insurance-given tax
preferences under ERISA.
156. Sun Life Financial, supra note 155.
157. Id.
158. See ALZHEIMER SOCIETY, ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE: CAUSES OF ALZHEIMER'S
DISEASE 4, available at http://www.alzheimer.ca/english/disease/causes-riskfac.htm:
"Twice as many women get Alzheimer's disease than men. This is partly due to
their living longer than men on average, partly because women are more prone
than men to get diabetes, but also in large part because in post-menopausal women
there is a decline of the important hormone estrogen." Id.
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LTCI Is TOO EXPENSIVE FOR MOST WOMEN
As noted, it is very difficult to estimate an otherwise
qualified (that is, healthy, non-disabled) individual's expected
cost of long-term care insurance in either the short or long runs.
LTCI was originally under-priced and oversold; as a result, LTCI
rates have been increasing at an extraordinary rate in the last
few years. In California, state employees were shocked when
notified of a thirty-four percent rate increase in the average
CalPERS long-term care insurance policy premium.159 The full
impact of such rate increases on the cost of long-term care
insurance policies is almost impossible to know, but it is clear
that historical "averages," such as those set out the federal
government's "Own Your Future" website (the goal of which is
to encourage the purchase of private long-term care policies),160
understate the current and future costs of these policies.
What we do know is that women are far less likely to have
the means to buy LTC. Data available from the original
Partnership program indicate that most participants in the
program were married couples having incomes substantially
higher than the national average. 61  Women, particularly
divorced women and widows, have virtually no "surplus"
income. The median income of working women ages fifty-five
to sixty-four (the age at which most financial advisors
recommend purchase of long-term care insurance) is $20,810,
159. The CalPERS Board of Trustees said that these rate increases were the result
of a number of factors, including that policyholders were "collecting benefits earlier
and using them longer. Claims volume has doubled over the last three years.
Program lapse rates have been less than anticipated. Significantly more members
have chosen plans with built-in inflation protection." See CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, MEMBER INFORMATION, LONG-TERM CARE, Q&A:
CALPERS LONG-TERM CARE PROGRAM RATE INCREASE 1, available at http://www.cal
pers.ca.gov/eip-docs/member/1tc/tc-rate%20increase-faqs%20pdf%20file.pdf.
160. See NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 151.
161. "Partnership and traditional long-term care insurance policyholders tend to
have higher incomes and more assets at the time they purchase their insurance,
compared with those without insurance. In two of the four states, more than half of
Partnership policyholders over 55 have a monthly income of at least $5,000 and
more than half of all households have assets of at least $350,000 at the time they
purchase a Partnership policy." GAO PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS, supra note 134.
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which is about half that of men of the same age.162 The median
annual income of Medicare eligible women is only $12,000, also
about half that of elderly men.163 The demographic make-up of
existing long-term care policy holders does not appear to be
available from either industry or government sources, but it is
safe to assume that the vast majority of current owners are men.
The notion that long-term care insurance is a viable solution to
most women's greater lifetime risk of needing long-term care
borders on the ridiculous.
In summary, the LTCP is a government-sponsored program
that will make a significant public benefit available to only a
particular group of Americans-upper middle class persons,
mostly males, who are fortunate enough not to have experienced
any physically or cognitively disabling health conditions.
Viewed through this lens, the program cannot survive a feminist
or disability-rights critique. Even if the Partnerships have the
potential to save Medicaid significant sums twenty or thirty
years from now, which does not appear likely, this aspect of the
DRA must be rejected as a means of protecting public benefits
for the "truly needy."
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS NON-DISCRIMINATORY FINANCING
OF LONG-TERM CARE
There is no question that this nation needs to look closely at the
means by which long-term care for elders with disabilities-
indeed, all heath care, for everyone-is financed. Many options
for restructuring the financing of long-term care for the elderly
are available-including adding a long-term care benefit to
Medicare or following the leads of Japan and Germany in
creating a separate social insurance program to provide long-
162. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, QUICK FACTS ON OLDER WORKERS,
OLDER WOMEN WORKERS, AGES 55 AND OVER, available at http://www.dol.gov
/wb/factsheets/Qf-olderworkers55.htm.
163. ELLEN O'BRIEN, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING
PROJECT, MEDICAID'S COVERAGE OF NURSING HOME COSTS: ASSET SHELTER FOR THE
WEALTHY OR ESSENTIAL SAFETY NET? 4 (May 2005), available at http://www.canhr.org
/reports/nursinghomecosts.pdf.
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term care for older Americans. These will require additional
taxes and may involve some general cost-shifting back to
consumers who use government-financed health care services.
But such cost-shifting should impact everyone, not just the
elderly and disabled.
The DRA's solution to a crisis (that at the moment is largely
manufactured) entailing the shifting of additional burdens onto
groups that already bear most of the tremendous economic and
emotional burdens that long-term disabilities implicate should
not be considered acceptable. Nor should taxpayers be forced to
support the long-term care partnerships, which amount to
government sponsored discrimination benefiting a small group
of wealthy, non-disabled Americans. The asset-transfer and
LTCP provisions of the DRA should be repealed while Congress
seeks gender- and ability-neutral solutions to the nation's future
financing of long-term care for the millions of seniors who will
need it in the coming decades.
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